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INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT:
THE MOVE TOWARD DANGEROUSNESS
ROBERT WEISSBOURD*
INTRODUCTION

The Facts
The National Institute for Mental Health estimates that in
1972 approximately 1,645,367 patients were treated at inpatient
psychiatric facilities in the United States.' Taking into account
an estimated 20% rate of duplicate admissions, approximately
1,316,294 individuals were treated at least once. 2 Of those patients admitted to state and county mental hospitals, 41.8% were
involuntarily committed. Another 1.5% were admitted as transferees from prison, and 2.3% were admitted after being found
incompetent to stand trial. 3 Thus, despite the policy shift over
the last 15 years toward an emphasis on voluntary short term
admissions, a tremendous number of people continue to be involuntarily committed.
Involuntary commitment and accompanying treatment have
traditionally been considered protective and humane, with the
potential to alleviate or cure mental illness ahd to help restore
the mentally disabled to a self-respecting, functioning role in society. However, closer examination of involuntary commitment,
its possible detrimental effects, and the quality of care in mental
institutions has demanded that the practice of involuntary commitment be reevaluated, refined, and to some extent, rejected.
The Supreme Court has noted that involuntary commitment
and treatment are a "massive curtailment of liberty."4 The right
to physical liberty, rights of privacy, association, freedom of
speech and belief, and freedom from unreasonable search and
* Associate with Pressman & Hartunian; former clerk to the Honorable George N. Leighton, United States District Court, Northern District of
Illinois, 1979-1981; J.D. University of Chicago Law School, 1979; B.A. cum
laude, political science, Yale University, 1976.
1. B. ENms & R. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 197 (1978)

[hereinafter cited as ENNIS & EMERY].
2. Id.
3. Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARv. L. REV. 1190, 1193 n.3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
4. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). See note 41 and accompanying text infra.
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seizure, may be seriously infringed. Institutions are frequently

overcrowded, understaffed, poorly maintained, and unsanitary.
In addition to having their lives totally regulated, patients risk
brutality from fellow patients and attendants. Treatment is frequently outdated, nonexistent, or inappropriate, and thus may
aggravate, rather than alleviate, a patient's condition. Commitment often results in severe social and legal deprivations, including possible loss of custody of children, loss of the right to
vote, to drive, to contract, and to retain public office.5 Finally,

the social and personal effects may include discrimination in education, housing and employment, as well as loss of self-confi6
dence, and self-esteem.
In the past decade, courts have begun to recognize the detriments of involuntary commitment, particularly the poor conditions and lack of treatment in many hospitals, 7 and the collateral
consequences on civil rights. 8 Furthermore, commitment may
aggravate a patient's illness9 and result in even greater stigma
and loss of liberty than criminal detention. 10
This article addresses only the legal issues raised by involuntary commitment. Discussion of the difficult issues surrounding the proper diagnosis and treatment of mental illness is
beyond its scope. It is assumed, however, that severe mental
disorders do exist, that some can be successfully treated, and
that many of those afflicted with such disorders would want
treatment if able to evaluate it."
5. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 ("all idiots and insane persons"
disqualified from voting); IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1973) (pilot's license
denied); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-206 (1981) (incompetent to contract); VA. CODE
ANN. § 46.1-360 (1950) (loss of right to obtain a driver's license). See also In
re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 623, 105 Cal. Rptr. 736 (Ct. App. 1972) (mother denied
child custody due to mental deficiency).
6. E. GoFFMAN, AsYLUms: ESSAYS ON THE SocIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 354-56 (1961).
7. See, e.g., Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966, 969-70 (M.D.
Pa. 1971).
8. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
9. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088-90 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated 379 F. Supp.
1376 (1974), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated
413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
10. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 393 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (because of
the stigmatization and loss of liberty, due process demands a showing of a
necessity for commitment by evidence having the highest degree of certitude reasonably attainable).
11. Of course, these issues cannot simply be assumed away. The tremendous disagreement concerning, and variable success with, the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness has major legal implications. However,
the above assumptions avoid a mistake made by many courts and commentators: the mistake of concluding from presently poor conditions, inade-
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The Issues
Mental illness is commonly viewed as a personal and medical problem, strictly within the ambit of psychiatrists and psychologists. Unlike many personal and medical problems,
however, a principle characteristic of mental illness is the individual's inability to adjust to society and to function productively within complex human and social relationships. 1 2 Where
maladjustment manifests itself as antisocial conduct, inability to
care for oneself, or reduced social productivity, mental illness
also becomes a social problem, and concomitantly, of legal
13
significance.
The most extreme intervention by the legal system is in the
area of involuntary commitment. The laws providing for involuntary commitment are grounded on two notions: the state's
responsiblity to protect society and its parental responsibility
for the disabled. The state fulfills these responsibilities acting,
respectively, under the police power 14 and in the role of parens
patriae.15 The use of these powers to involuntarily commit has
engendered tremendous controversy. Broad criteria have permitted well intentioned laws to be used for control of deviant
behavior, to substitute for social welfare programs, and to relieve society of the intolerable or untolerated. 16 Opponents of
involuntary commitment, particularly civil libertarians, point to
the great deprivations of personal freedom and intrusions into
mental and emotional processes. Proponents, emphasizing psychiatric concerns, cite the need of some individuals for treatment, their inability to recognize their need and request help,
and the prevention of injury which the mentally disabled may
inflict on themselves or others, or which others may inflict on
them.
During the past decade, a veritable revolution has taken
place in the laws providing for involuntary commitment. Growing awareness of civil liberties concerns and of the poor state of
diagnosis and treatment demanded a search for safeguards.
Consequently, courts have restricted the use of parenspatriae
quate treatment, and diagnostic unreliability that it is impossible to define,
diagnose, and treat mental illness.
12. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy,
57 MICH. L. REV. 945, 954-55 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Ross].
13. Id.
14. See notes 33-38 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the

origin and history of the police power.
15. See notes 24-32 and accompanying text infra.
16. MENTAL DIsABILrTY LAw

REPORTER,

July-August 1977 at 77 [hereinaf-

ter cited as MDLR]. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25
(1905).
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as a justification for commitment, substituting instead a greater
reliance on the police power and limiting commitment to the
a
dangerous. As one commentator has noted, there has been 17
"move toward dangerousness" in civil commitment statutes.
In effect, courts have tried to resolve the tension between legal
and psychiatric concerns by emphasizing a largely legal concept: dangerousness. Use of a narrow legal analytical framework, and emphasis on dangerousness, entails a substantial
rejection of, or at least insensitivity to psychiatric concerns and
ignores the reasons that a separate commitment scheme has
been developed for the mentally ill. While major safeguards
against abuse of involuntary commitment are necessary, other
safeguards are more appropriate than the dangerousness requirement, either as substitutes or supplements. Through an
examination of the parens patriae power, and the concerns
which have led to its limitation, this article'will focus on whether
wisdom or the Constitution dictate that dangerousness be a necessary or sufficient condition for involuntary commitment of the
mentally ill.
The flipside of the question is whether humane considerations indicate greater use of parens patriae to commit the
nondangerous but treatable mentally ill. Of the commitments
eliminated by the dangerousness requirement, it is this class of
people, particularly if they are incompetent, which should be
commitable.
The Constitutional question raised remains unsettled, at
least by the Supreme Court. In one of its few recent decisions
dealing with involuntary commitment, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to address the issue of "whether the state may
mentally ill individual for
compulsorily confine a nondangerous,
8
the purpose of treatment."1
THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COMMITMENT

Introduction
Civil commitment is based on significantly different theoretical grounds than criminal confinement. Unlike the retributiondeterrance approach of the criminal system, civil commitment
relies on a prediction-prevention model, a model notably more
akin to the medical model for diseases. 19 The purposes of criminal incarceration, retribution, general deterrance, special deter17. DIAGNOSIS AND DEBATE, INSIGHT COMMUNICATIONS, 335 (R. Bonnie
ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as INSIGHT COMMUNICATIONS].

18. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
19. See Ross supra note 12, at 954.
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rance, and rehabilitation, have limited application to
commitment of the mentally ill. Retribution is clearly inappropriate, since, in the case of civil commitment, no act deserving
retribution has occurred. It is also commonly argued that general deterrance is an unacceptable purpose since at least a portion of the mentally ill, by definition, are less responsible and
less able to adjust to social rules, i.e., are less deterrable. 20 Special deterrance, incarceration to prevent the person incarcerated
from inflicting harm or further harm, applies only to the extent
that the grounds for commitment are dangerousness. As discussed below however, this justification presents equal protection problems because only the mentally ill are incarcerated for
dangerousness. 21 Finally, rehabilitation is a major function of
however, appears to be
civil commitment. The criminal model,
22
moving away from this justification.
In addition to protecting others from the dangerous mentally ill (special deterrance), civil commitment is traditionally
justified on the basis that it protects the mentally ill from harming themselves, and provides them with care, custody, and treatment. 23 State action to prevent harm to others is clearly an
exercise of the police power, while state enforced treatment is
clearly an exercise of the parenspatriae power. Action to prevent harm to self partakes of both, although primarily in the role
of parens patriae.
Parens Patriae
Courts and commentators have provided thorough descriptions of the history and development of the doctrine of parens
patriae.24 It is founded on the notion that certain individuals
20. Id.
21. See note 50 and accompanying text infra.
22. See Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirementfor
Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 562, 564
(1977); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 657-58 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Social Accountability: Preface to an Integrated Theory of Criminaland Mental Health Sanc-

tions, Proceedings of the Biannual Conference on Psychology, Lincoln,
Nebraska at 4 (1974).
23. In the landmark decision of In re Oakes, Chief Justice Shaw stated
that "the great law of humanity" justified depriving an insane person of his
freedom whenever his "own safety or that of others require[d] that he
should be restrained for a certain time, and [when] restraint [was] necessary for his restoration, or [would] be conductive thereto." In re Oakes, 8
Law Rep. 122, 125 (Mass. 1845).
24. See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47. See generally N.
KrITRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1973 ed.).
Extensive discussion of the development of parens patriae may be
found in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078,
1088-89 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on proceduralgrounds 414 U.S. 473 (1974),
reinstated,379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 421 U.S.
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are unable to act for themselves and are incompetent. 25 This requirement, however, has been substantially emasculated, 26 and
the doctrine, once described as "more a state fiscal policy than a
humanitarian doctrine, '27 has a long history of abuse.
The Supreme Court has suggested that the parenspatriae
power is inherent in the nature of the modern state, and is "a
most beneficient function, and often necessary to be exercised
in the interests of humanity. '28 The doctrine underlies state
laws protecting minors, establishing guardianships, and providing for involuntary commitment. Its use to detain the mentally
ill in order to provide for their rehabilitation is commonly traced
to the landmark case of In re Oakes.29 There, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that the "great law of humanity" allows
states to confine an insane person whenever his "own safety or
that of others require that he should be restrained for a certain
time, and [when] restraint [was] necessary for his restoration
or [would] be conducive thereto. '30 The language of Oakes suggests that dangerousness to self or others is required. Josiah
Oakes, however, was a nonviolent elderly individual who was
957 (1975), reinstated,413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976); State ex rel Hawks
v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974); Curtis, The Checkered Career of
Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant? 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 895
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Checkered Career].
25. The earliest recognition of the doctrine of parenspatriae in English
law is in the document known as PrerogativeRegis, which either paralleled
or was based on Roman law. See State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d
109, 117 (W. Va. 1974). Parenspatriae expressed the PrerogativeRegis, or
king's prerogative, under which the king was considered to be personally
sovereign and preeminent. See Checkered Career,supra note 24, at 895-98.
This preeminance, is explained by Chitty:
The king is in legal contemplation the guardian of his people and in
that amiable capacity is entitled (or rather it is his majesty's duty, in
return for the allegiance paid him) to take care of his subjects as are
legally unable, on account of mental incapacity, whether it proceed
from first, nonage (children); second, idiocy; or third, lunacy; to take
proper care of themselves and their property. J. CH=rrr, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 155 (1820).
26. See notes 142-45 and accompanying text infra.
27. State ex re. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 109, 118-19
(1974).
During the settling of the American colonies, the king had authority to
act as "the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics." Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972), quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47. While the law required that the king act to promote the best
interests of his wards, the doctrine was generally not used to "protect," but
to take, the property of the insane. After the American Revolution, the
parenspatriaepower was vested in the legislatures, which often delegated
their authority to the courts. See ENNs &EMERY, supra note 1, at 36; Developments, supra note 3, at 1208.
28. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).
29. 8 Law Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845).
30. Id. at 124-25.
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committed after threatening to engage in speculative financial
of questionable
ventures and becoming engaged to a woman
3
'
wife.
his
of
death
the
after
shortly
character
Since Oakes, and until recently, courts and legislatures
have exercised parens patriae for involuntary commitment of
the mentally ill for the individuals' own benefit, not only when
dangerous to themselves, but also for care and treatment. In essence the doctrine of parens patriae is meant to protect and
help individuals who cannot protect and help themselves.
As discussed below, due process applies to parens patriae
commitments and thus requires substantial limitations. 32 Indeed, when properly interpreted and applied, the doctrine has
several built-in safeguards, including the requirements of incompetence and treatability. It has the advantage of focusing on
mental illness and its treatment, rather than simply on
dangerousness.
Police Power
The police power is the inherent power of the states as sovereigns to promote or protect the public health, safety, welfare,
and morals. 33 Police power is distinguished from parenspatriae
by its purpose to protect or promote societal rather than individual interests. The state's police power is not, however, unlimited. State action must promote public interests that "require
such interference" by reasonably necessary and "not unduly oppressive" means. 34 When state action either creates suspect
classifications or infringes upon fundamental liberties, substantive due process and equal protection require that the public interests advanced be compelling, or at least outweigh the
be
infringement of liberty. Furthermore, the action taken must
35
the least restrictive means of furthering those interests.
The primary state interest asserted for police power commitments is the protection of society from the dangerous mentally ill.36 This constitutes a valid state interest and, if an
individual is sufficiently dangerous, this interest may be compel31. Id. at 127-29.
32. See notes 39-49 and accompanying text infra. See also Curtis, The
Checkered Careerof ParensPatriae: The State as Parensor Tyrant?, 25 DE
PAUL L. REV. 895 (1976).
33. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905). For a
general discussion of the police power, see Comment, Police Power in Illinois: The Regulation of Private Conduct, 1972 U. ILL. LF. 158.
34. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), quoted in, Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962).
35. See note 151 and accompanying text infra.
36. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1223.
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ling enough to justify civil commitment. 37 The desire to protect
the individual's health and welfare, particularly one who is suicidal, is also asserted as a state interest in police power commitment. Authorities suggest that suicidal behavior falls within the
police power because suicide has direct and substantial consequences upon the lives of others, especially family members of
the deceased. 38 More often, it is argued that protection of the
individual's welfare generally is within the state's police power
interest. Due process and equal protection analyses suggest,
however, that the state's interest in protecting the individual is
not compelling enough to justify use of the police power to
commit.
PRESENT STATE OF THE LAw

ConstitutionalTests and Limitations-Supreme Court Cases
Due Process
Indisputably, due process considerations apply to civil commitment. Indeed, most of the recent developments in the law of
civil commitment have been based on the due process clause.
The Supreme Court has indirectly addressed the issue of standards for commitment in several cases concerning the commit39
ment of persons accused of criminal activity.

In Jackson v. Indiana, the court considered commitment
following a finding of incompetence to stand trial, and held that
"due process requires that the nature and duration of the commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purposes for
which the individual is committed. '40 In Humphrey v. Cady, the
Court interpreted a Wisconsin provision authorizing commitment in the interest of the welfare of an individual or others to
require a "social and legal judgment that his potential for doing
harm, to himself or to others, [be] great enough to justify such a
massive curtailment of liberty."' 41 This suggestion of substantive due process interest-balancing, though barely articulated,
was followed when the court directly addressed the standards
for civil commitment outside the criminal context in O'Connorv.
Donaldson.42
37. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905).
38. ENNis & EMERY, supra note 1, at 49.
39. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Greenwood v.
United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
40. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
41. 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).

42. 422 U.S. 563 (1975); see Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980),

afg in part 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), cert. granted, No. 80-1417
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Kenneth Donaldson was involuntarily committed to a
mental hospital for nearly fifteen years even though he was not
dangerous to himself or others. He had friends willing to care
for him, and refused professional treatment, probably on religious grounds. A jury, subsequently, awarded Donaldson damages for violation of his constitutional right to liberty. The court
of appeals affirmed in a broad opinion, finding a constitutional
right of a person, involuntarily committed, to receive treatment
that will give him a reasonable opportunity to cure or improve
his mental condition. The court implied, however, that given
such treatment, it would be constitutionally permissable for a
state to confine a mentally ill person against his will even if he is
not dangerous to himself or others. The Supreme Court agreed
that Donaldson's confinement was unconstitutional, but declined to consider, and disapproved of the appellate court's holding, concerning the right to treatment.
The Court considered and rejected the various state interests asserted, announcing that a mere finding of mental illness,
an interest in providing minimal living standards, 43 and an interest in protecting citizens from exposure to the mentally ill were
not sufficient grounds for commitment. The court phrased its
holding in narrow terms and expressly declined to decide:

whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may
be confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary
confinement of such a person-to prevent injury to the public, to
ensure 44his own survival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his
illness.
The Donaldson case does, however, prescribe a due process
45
interest balancing test and a least restrictive means analysis.
The test's flexibility is notable though it provides only limited
guidance, requiring that this balancing be done on a case by
case basis, accommodating the special interests-societal and
individual-reflected by the specific factual context.4 Various
(April 20, 1981) (several balancing standards scrutinized before medication administered); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(need to balance patient interests against legitimate interest of state); see

also Comment, Overt DangerousBehavior as a ConstitutionalRequirement

for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. Cm. L REv. 562,
567-69 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Overt Dangerousness].
43. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The court did note that
the state's "proper interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying." Id. at 575.
44. Id. at 573-74 (footnote omitted).
45. See Jackson v. Indiana 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Overt Dangerousness,
supra note 42, at 569.
46. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 (1975) (Burger,
C.J. concurring); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (E.D. Wis.
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courts have identified and balanced these interests differently in
47
the area of civil commitment.
Although the Supreme Court, both generally and particularly in the mental health area, has interpreted substantive due
process to require interest balancing, the court has also articulated a compelling state interest test. Due process requires that
state action be reasonably related to valid state goals, but that
action affecting fundamental interests be related to compelling
state goals. 48 Commitment, as a "massive deprivation of liberty," clearly affects a fundamental interest, and several courts
have analyzed commitment standards in terms of a compelling
state interest test. 49 Since courts often engage in interest balancing to determine whether a given state interest is "compelling," the practical difference betweeen the two tests is
frequently insignificant.
Void for Vagueness

Another aspect of due process which limits involuntary
commitment is the vagueness doctrine. Most courts agree that
the doctrine applies to civil commitment.5 0 The void for vagueness doctrine requires that statutes providing for incarceration
1972), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated,413 F.

Supp. 1978, 1318 (1976).
47. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), affig in part, 478 F. Supp.
1342 (D. Mass. 1979); cert. granted, No. 80-1417 (April 20, 1981) (physician's
finding that antipsychotic medicine could cause harm outweighed by need
to prevent violence); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(administration of mood altering drugs to patient without informed consent
violates due process unless patient is dangerous to himself or others); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacatedon procedural grounds,414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated,379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated
on procedural grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318

(1976) (even an overt attempt to substantially harm oneself cannot be the
basis for civil commitment unless person is found to be mentally ill and in
immediate danger at the time of the hearing of doing further harm to oneself). See also People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974)
(commitment of a person in need of medical treatment without evidence of
harmful conduct is not a per se violation of due process); Commonwealth
ex. rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. 155, 339 A.2d 764, 771 (1975) (immense
individual interests involved in civil commitment lead inexorably to analogy with the criminal justice system).
48. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (reasonable relation); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). See also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (compelling interest required to justify infringement
of fundamental interests).
49. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972),

vacated on proceduralgrounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated,379 F. Supp.
1376 (1974), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated,

413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
50. Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Penn. 1976); Stamas v. Leonhard, 414 F. Supp. 439 (D. Iowa 1976); United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, No. 72 C. 2104 (N.D. Ill., filed Aug. 18, 1975).
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be drawn with sufficient specificity to provide fair warning of
what conduct is proscribed, and to restrict the discretion of authorities. 51 The doctrine thus serves two purposes: first, it requires fair notice of the forbidden conduct; second, it limits the
possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The
fair notice requirement probably does not apply to civil commitment, because commitment statutes focus on an individual's status as mentally ill and/or dangerous, and not on the individual's
conduct. 52 However, the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in commitment determinations is substantial.
While courts are split, several have found statutory definitions
of mental illness and dangerousness so vague as to violate due
process. 5 3 Some of these courts have sought to cure vagueness
and safeguard against arbitrariness by requiring not only dangerousness, but an overt act.M While the dangerousness coupled with an overt act requirement may satisfy the void for
55
vagueness doctrine, other safeguards are equally satisfactory.
Equal Protection
Equal protection requires a reasonable and rationale basis
for state classifications resulting in differential treatment.
Where fundamental interests are affected or "suspect classifications" utilized, state action must be justified by a compelling interest.56 The equal protection clause sets various limitations on
commitment standards, particularly, the dangerousness re57
quirement discussed later in this article.
Punishmentfor Status: An Analogy
In Jackson v. Indiana, the court remarked that "considering
the number of persons affected by involuntary commitment, it is
perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations have not been more frequently litigated. '58 The court cited
51. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162-63 (1972).
52. See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 451 (D. Iowa 1976);
See Overt Dangerousness,supra note 42 at 588.

53. See, e.g., Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Penn. 1976); Stamus v.
Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (D. Iowa 1976). Cf. In re Salem, 31 N.C. App. 57,
228 S.E.2d 649, 651-52 (1976). But see Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 983, 991
(C.D. Cal. 1979); In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977); In re Williams, 297
So. 2d 458 (La. Ct. App. 1974); State v. O'Neill, 247 Or. 59, 545 P.2d 97 (1976).
54. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
55. See Overt Dangerousness,supra note 42, at 589.
56. See Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1202
(1974); Developments, supra note 3, at 1215.

57. See notes 105-137 and accompanying text infra.
58. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972).
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59
Robinson v. California,
which considered punishment for status as violative of the eighth amendment. 60 Referring to a California statute making it a criminal offense to "be addicted to the
use of narcotics," 61 the Robinson court held that imposition of
punishment and imprisonment for the status of being an addict
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. At the same time, however,
62
the Robinson court explicitly sanctioned civil commitment.
The Jackson court's reliance upon Robinson, as precedent for
suggesting a restriction on the power to commit is therefore
puzzling.
This legal labelling game-civil v. criminal-was condemned
five years later in In re Gault.63 The Court has since rejected
the significance of labels, and instead looks to the substantive
effect of confinement on protected interests. Despite certain
similarities of incarceration and commitment, their practical effects may differ markedly. Commitment is not meant to be punitive in purpose and may be based on the need for treatment.
The Robinson court's encouragement of civil commitment reflects support of state action to provide treatment for ill citizens.
Commitment on the basis of dangerousness, focusing on protecting society and not on providing treatment, especially where
no treatment is offered, is, however, akin to criminal incarceration and may constitute unconstitutional punishment for
64
status.

59. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1960). The court also cited for
the same proposition, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). Id.
60. 406 U.S. 715, 737 n.23.
61. 370 U.S. 660 (1960).
62. It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would at-

tempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a
leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease. A State might determine that the general health and welfare require that the victims of
these and other human afflictions be dealt with by compulsory treatment involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestration.
Id. at 666. See Abramovsky &McCarthy, Civil Commitment of Non-Criminal
NarcoticAddits: ParensPatriae;A Valid Exercise of a State's Police Power;
or an UnconscionableDisregardof Individual Liberty?, 38 U. Prrr. L.REV.
477 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Disregardof Individual Liberty].
63. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 TEx. L. REV.

1277, 1321 (1973).
64. BRAKEL & ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 40-41 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as BRAKEL &ROCK]; Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures,79 HARv. L. REV. 1288, 1291 (1966).
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Recent Developments in the Law--the Move
Toward Dangerousness
During the past decade, several courts and legislatures have
determined that parens patriae is an insufficient authority to
commit the incompetent mentally ill for treatment. The same
courts allow police power commitments of those dangerous to
themselves. The legal grounds for rejecting parenspatriae have
varied and not always been well articulated, but include due
process interest balancing, the compelling interest and vagueness doctrines, and statutory construction. The practical
grounds emphasize: the unreliability of the diagnosis of mental
illness; 65 the failure of statutes to adequately define mental illness; 66 the recognition that treatment is too rarely provided and
often not successful; and recognition of the individual's nontreatment concerns such as loss of liberty, stigmatization, and
invasions of privacy. Quite arguably, the real reason for rejecting parens patriae commitment is dissatisfaction with the result. Too often, the underlying premise of parens patria-that
the individual will benefit from commitment-has been false.
The move toward police power/dangerousness commitments may also be perceived as a response to the arbitrary use
ofparenspatriae authority in the past. When civil commitment
was based upon parens patriae, the relationship between indiin
vidual and state was not viewed as adversarial, and resulted
67
relaxed due process and nominal procedural protection.
In re Gault, a Supreme Court reaction to the "procedural
laxness" associated with parenspatriae,rejected the ostensibly
nonadversarial connotation of the "civil" label. The Court
stressed the due process limitations to which parens patriae is
subject, 68 and in tracing the history of the doctrine, concluded
that its "meaning is murky and its historical credentials are of
65. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1978, 1094 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on procedural
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated,379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated on
proceduralgrounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated,413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976);
Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. 155, 339 A.2d 764, 777-78 (1975).
66. ENNis &EMERY, supra note 1, at 37.
67. See Note, Mental Health-United States ex rel. Mathew v. NelsonCivil Commitment of the Mentally Ill Based on a Finding of Dangerousness
is ConstitutionalEven Though Dangerousnessis Not Inferredfrom a Recent,
Overt DangerousAct, 7 Loy. U.L.J. 507, 510 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Constitutionality of Dangerousness1. See generally Note, Hospitalizationof the
Mentally Ill: Due Process and Equal Protection, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 187
(1969) (author concluded that "as long as the courts engage in legal sematics and fail to consider the true nature of the admission proceeding, protection of the patient's legal rights will be hampered).
68. In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 12-31 (1967).
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dubious relevance. '69 Subsequent case law, discussed below,
further develops and implements this proposition that exercise
of parens patriae power had for too long escaped the requirements of due process.
In Dixon v. Attorney General,70 a class action by state
mental hospital patients, the district court held a provision of
the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act authorizing commitment in the interest of any "person [who] is
mentally disabled and in need of care" 7 1 unconstitutional on its
face and as applied. The plaintiffs in Dixon had already served
time for criminal offenses. They were recommitted under the
Mental Health Act, for an indefinite period, without the benefit
of counsel, independent psychological evaluation, or an authentic finding of mental disability.
The court first reviewed the conditions at the maximum security hospital, finding: treatment "grossly inadequate"; 72 and
confinement in a maximum security institution unnecessary for
civil patients and not conducive to rehabilitation. 73 Relying on
Gault, the court rejected the argument that parenspatriae permitted this lack of procedural protection and held the relevant
section of the act "almost completely devoid of the due process
of law required by the fourteenth amendment. '74 The court did
not consider whether the state could commit the nondangerous
mentally ill for the purpose of treatment if procedural due process standards were satisfied. The consent agreement, however,
to self or others for involuntary
required dangerousness
75
confinement.
Lessard v. Schmidt 76 was a class action contesting the validity of Wisconsin commitment procedures. Though twice vacated
69. Id. at 16. The doctrine's shortcomings were further expressed as
follows:
[t] he phrase was taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was
used to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the
purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of the child.
But there is no trace of the doctrine in the history of criminal
jurisprudence.
Id. at 16-17. More recent cases have continued the discrediting of parens
patriae. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358

(1970).
70. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

968, n.2.
969.
970.
972.

75. However, the consent agreement required dangerousness to self or

others for involuntary confinement. Id. at 974.
76. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on proceduralgrounds,
414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated,379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated on procedural grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated,413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
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on procedural grounds by the Supreme Court, Lessard was reinstated by the district court, and has become one of the most frequently cited cases in this area. The lower court, in a fairly
comprehensive opinion, held the Wisconsin commitment procedure violative of due process. Defects included: inadequate notice of charges and the right to a jury; forty-eight hour detention
without a probable cause hearing and two weeks without a full
hearing; lack of counsel; failure to adhere to the rules of evidence; and failure to require proof of mental illness and dangerWisconsin had
ousness beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover,
77
not considered less restrictive alternatives.
The court began its analysis by stating that a compelling
state interest must be shown to justify deprivation of a fundamental liberty. 78 Noting that the same fundamental liberties are
at stake in civil and criminal commitments, but that due process
safeguards are much more limited in civil commitments, the
Lessard court acknowledged that use of the dangerousness criterion for commitment results in differential treatment of the
mentally ill and implied that equal protection problems might
result from the dangerousness standard.79 Unfortunately, the
court never returned to the issue. 80
77. 349 F. Supp. at 1103.
78. Id. at 1084. However, later in the opinion, the district court employed the balancing test used in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)
(and implicit in Humphrey v. Cody, 405 U.S. 504 (1972)). See notes 48-53 and
accompanying text supra.
79. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on
proceduralgrounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated,379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974),

vacated on proceduralgrounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp.
1318 (1976).
This has been justified on the premise that the state is acting in the role
of parens patriae, and thus depriving an individual of liberty not to
punish him but to treat him. Additionally, it is said that the individual
may be deprived of liberty under the police power because of society's
need to protect itself against the potential dangerous acts of persons
who, because of mental illness, are likely to act irrationally. The fact
that '[i] f a sociologist predicted that a person was eighty per cent likely
to commit a felonious act, no law would permit his confinement,' but
under the same circumstances a psychiatrist's recommendation of commitment is likely to be accepted, is sought to be justified on the basis of
potential benefit to the confined in a mental institution. In effct, the
present action challenges the validity of this difference in treatment.
Id. at 1084. This statement recognizes the equal protection problems stemring from the dangerousness requirement, and reveals the importance of
focusing on treatment as potentially justifying differential classification of
the mentally ill.
80. The court also declined to consider the issue of a constitutional right
to treatment, but noted that the right would be hard to enforce, and the
reality is that treatment is inadequate or unavailable, and hospitalization
may be detrimental. In any event, the court suggested a person should not
be treated against his will without due process safeguards. See also Note,
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After extensive enumeration of the detrimental effects of
commitment upon an individual, the court concluded, however,
that stringent due process safeguards were necessary despite
the civil label which attaches to commitment proceedings. 8 1 The
court further held that dangerousness must be extremely likely,
imminent, shown by a recent overt act, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.82 Imminent dangerousness was required because of the difficulty of predicting dangerousness and
particularly because of the definitional ambiguity of mental illness. 83 Finally, the requirement of imminent danger was justified by comparing the mentally ill with the physically ill who
84
may opt not to undergo treatment.
It is difficult to see how requiring imminent dangerousness
provides the best justification, or even an adequate justification,
for differential treatment of the mentally ill. The Lessard analysis could be invoked in support of an incompetence requirement; incompetence could justify differential treatment of the
The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134 (1967). "Accepting that
due process does not forbid involuntary detention for the purpose of rendering care and treatment under the parenspatriaerole, it is still clear that
such detention does not meet due process requirements if, in actual practice, treatment beneficial to the patient is not rendered." Id. at 1140. See
also Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Cf. Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966) ("Apart from raising questions as to
the adequacy of custodial and treatment facilities and policies, some of
which are not within judicial competence.").
81. In addition to citing numerous statutory disabilities associated with
an adjudication of mental illness in Wisconsin at the time, the court also
discussed the difficulties that a committed individual faces in attempting to
adjust to life outside the institution following release.
The stigma which accompanies any hospitalization for mental illness
has been brought to public attention in the news stories surrounding
the recent resignation of a vice-presidential aspirant from further candidacy. Evidence is plentiful that a former mental patient will encounter serious obstacles in attempting to find a job, sign a lease or buy a
house. One commentator, noting that "former mental patients do not
get jobs," has insisted that, "[in] the job market, it is better to be an exfelon than an ex-patient." (cite omitted)
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated,379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), va-

cated on procedural grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated,413 F. Supp.
1318 (1976).
82. 349 F. Supp. at 1093-95.
83. Id. at 1094; See, e.g., Livermore, Malmquist, &Miehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment, 117 PA. L. REV. 75, 80 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Livermore].
84. "The same should be true of persons in need of treatment for mental
illness unless the state can prove that the person is unable to make a decision about hospitalization because of the nature of his illness." Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1094. Indeed, considering the nontreatment effects
of mental hospitalization, the court suggested that it is more likely to be
rational to refuse mental treatment than to accept it. See note 80 supra.
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mentally ill. The court did not, however, venture a departure
from the familiar language of dangerousness.
In re Levias,85 closely following and relying on Lessard, rejected the state's argument that its interest in providing care
and treatment justified commitment of a nondangerous
psychotic:
The doctrine of parens patriae, rigorously discredited by the United
States Supreme Court in In re Gault . .. can no longer provide an
adequate basis for the incarceration of individuals who had committed no crime, who are able to function reasonably well in society, and who pose no threat to themselves or others, despite some
degree of mental illness. ... Weighed against the fundamental in-

terests at stake in commitment proceedings, the interest of the
state in the commitment of nondangerous persons is less than compelling. 86 (emphasis in original)
The Levias court was not confronted with issues of treatment
and incompetence. It reasoned that since parens patriae had
been discredited, the remaining justification was the police
power, which only applied to the dangerous. In re Gault did not,
however, completely reject the parens patriae power, but rather
held that it did not justify lack of due process. Thus, Levias suggests that dangerousness should precede commitment under
parens patriae,as well as police power, authority. The case restricts, but does not preclude parens patriae commitment.
Parens patriae commitment was more fully evaluated in
State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro,8 7 where the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia considered a habeas corpus challenge
to the constitutionality of involuntary commitment statutes on
their face and as applied. Most of the challenges were procedural. The court recognized these due process rights, rejecting the
argument that the doctrine of parens patriae justifies relaxed
procedures. After an extensive review of the doctrine, 88 suggesting that it "has been suspect from the earliest times,"8 9 the
court concluded that "the ancient doctrine of parens patriae is
in full retreat on all fronts except in those very narrow areas
where the state can demonstrate, as a matter of fact, that its care
and custody is superior to any available alternative." 90 Examination of the care and custody of the mentally ill in Virginia revealed that treatment was poor, often detrimental, and certainly
did not justify relaxation of due process standards. Thus, the
section of the statute which permitted parens patriae commit85.
86.
87.
88.

83 Wash. 2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1973).
Id. at 257, 517 P.2d at 591.
202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974).
Id. at 117-20.

89. Id. at 119.

90. Id. at 120.
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ment for those in need of custody, care or treatment was held
violative of due process. The court also relied on the vagueness
doctrine, suggesting that commitment based on speculative benefits to the individual permits an "entirely subjective determination," and creates opportunities for abuse. Finally, the court
suggested that the state could not demonstrate any compelling
state interest under the police power for hospitalizing a person
in his own best interests. 91
In Lynch v. Baxley,92 the court interpreted the cases above
to require, along with various procedural safeguards, that commitment be based on findings of mental illness, a present threat
of substantial harm to himself or others, a recent overt act, and
treatment availability (if the illness is treatable). 93 The court
also required that the commitment be the least restrictive alternative. 94 The court recognized that commitment predicated
upon dangerousness to self was based on the "parenspatriae
notion that the State is the ultimate guardian of those of its citizens who are incapable of caring for their own interests" 95 and
thus required an additional finding of incompetence. Given the
difficulties of diagnosing mental illness and predicting dangerousness, a recent overt act was required to satisfy the due process requirement of showing substantial dangerousness.
The court in Kendall v. True, 96 relying in part on the vagueness doctrine, declared commitment of the incompetent mentally ill unconstitutional and required dangerousness. The case
is notable for its explicit rejection of the significance of incompetence, thus following Hawks rather than Lynch. According to
the Kendall court, those who can and prefer to survive outside
an institution, regardless of incompetence, have the constitutional right to do So. 97 The court upheld the section of the statute providing for commitment of the dangerous incompetent
mentally ill, and commented that "at worst the incapacity provision is superfluous."9 8
91. Id. at 123.
92. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
93. The Lynch court analyzed and relied upon the following landmark
cases: Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1977); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972); the court of appeals decision in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d
507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1974); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123
(Mass. 1845).
94. Lynch v. Baxlay 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
95. Id. at 390.
96. 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975).
97. Id. at 418.
98. Id. at 420.
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Several other cases are consistent. 99 Often, dangerousness

is required to safeguard against vagueness in the statutory definition of mental illness, while an overt act is required to safeguard against the vagueness of the dangerousness concept. 10 0
Several courts, however, have not required an overt act' 0 ' and
have held that the term "mental illness" is not vague or arbitrary.'0 2 In effect, the courts agree on the factors involved, but
weigh them differently; the latter courts emphasize treatment
"rational bases" rather than "compelling
and discuss
10 3
interests.'
99. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), aff'g in part, 478 F. Supp.
1342 (D. Mass. 1979) (nothing in statutory scheme suggests finding of
mental incompetency equivalent to incapacity); Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d
173 (9th Cir. 1980) (invalidated civil commitment statute which authorized
involuntary commitment based on danger to self or others, used more precise legal term of "imminent" danger); Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640 (M.D.
Penn. 1976); Stamus v. Leonhard, 414 F. Supp. 439 (D. Iowa 1976); Bell v.
Wayne County Hospital, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Finken v. Roop,
234 Pa. Super. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1975); In re Gary Seefield, No. 454-255
(Wis. Oct. 31, 1977). But see Coll v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 912 (D.N.J.
1976); Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348 278 N.E.2d 615, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1972).
100. Regarding the requirement of an overt act, see Altman v. Hofferber,
167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836 (1980) (defendant can be indefinitely institutionalized upon showing he is charged with violent felony and is incompetent to stand trial, as long as there is a showing that defendant is currently
dangerous beyond reasonable doubt); Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775
(1980) (two prisoners jailed for sex offenses had Constitutional right to type
of treatment that would cure or improve mental condition); Comment,
Overt DangerousBehavior as a ConstitutionalRequirementfor Involuntary
Civil Commitment of the Mentally ll, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 562 (1977) (concludes that the overt act requirement may be sufficient, but not necessary,
to satisfy the constitutional challenges).
101. Rogers v. Okin,634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), a fg in part, 478 F. Supp.
1342 (D. Mass. 1979) (no overt act but individual estimation of possibility
and type of violence); Suzuki v. Yuen, 48 U.S.L.W. 1170 (9th Cir. Apr. 16,
1980) (court mandated "imminent" danger standard); U.S. ex rel. Matthew
1975), reported in Casenote, Mental
v. Nelson, 461 F. supp. 707 (N.D. Ill.
Health-UnitedStates ex rel. Matthew v. Nelson-Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill Based on a Finding of Dangerousnessis Constitutional,Even
Though DangerousnessIs Not Inferredfrom a Recent, Overt DangerousAct,
7 LoY. CHL. L.J. 507 (1976); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d
733 (1974); In re Salem, 31 N.C. App. 57, 228 S.E.2d 649 (1976).
102. People v. Taylor, 618 P.2d 1127 (Col.1980), (Colorado permits involuntary short-term civil commitment of those "in need of medical supervision, treatment, care, or restraint," when such condition results in inability
to take care of "basic personal needs," is not unconstitutionally vague);
People v. Sansone, 18 111. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974).
103. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill.
App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974); In re Salem 31 N.C. App. 57,
228 S.E.2d 649 (1976); Casenote, Mental Health-United States ex rel. Matthew v. Nelson-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill Based on a Finding of
Dangerousness is Constitutional Even Though Dangerousness Is Not Inferredfrom a Recent, Overt DangerousAct, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 507, 515 (1976).
See generally L. Tancendi, The Rights of Mental Patients: Weighing the Interests, 5 J. HEALTH PoLrrcs PoLicy L. 199 (1980).
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The reasoning and present state of the law was fairly sum10 4
marized in Doremus v. Farrell:
Considering the fundamental rights involved in civil commitment,
the parenspatriae power must require a compelling interest of the
state to justify the deprivation of liberty. In the mental health field,
where diagnosis and treatment are uncertain, the need for treatment without some degree of imminent harm to the person or dangerousness to society is not a compelling justification ....
To
permit involuntary commitment upon finding of "mental illness"
and the need for treatment alone would be tantamount to condoning the State's commitment of persons deemed socially undesirable for the purpose of indoctrination or conforming the
individual's beliefs of the State. Due process and equal protection
require that (a) that the person is mentally ill and poses a serious
threat of substantial harm to himself or to others; and (b) that this
threat of harm has been evidenced by a recent overt act or threat.
The threat of harm to oneself may be through neglect or inability to
care for oneself. 10 5
Thus, the lower courts have gone beyond O'Connor v. Donaldson and held that the Constitution requires that an individual
be dangerous to be committed. These courts either implicitly or
explicitly reject the need for treatment as grounds for commitment. The result would be more convincing if greater attention
were given to the possibility of requiring incompetency as a distinguishing feature of parens patriae commitments. The courts
have, instead, leaped from a concern over the lack of procedural
safeguards to a dangerousness requirement and have failed to
explore alternatives responsive to the problems of poor diagnostic reliability and treatment.
The dangerousness requirement is an appealing threshold
condition, since it partially avoids the treatment controversies
and is closer to the criminal model, with which the courts are
comfortable. The constitutional argument is that unless an individual is dangerous, the state's interest in providing treatment
does not outweigh the individual's interest in liberty. Nevertheless, the dangerousness requirement presents several legal and
social problems. Considering the existence of alternative safeguards, legal and mental health concerns suggest that the dangerousness requirement should be replaced or supplemented.
PROBLEMS AI

SOLUTIONS

Critique of the Dangerousness Requirement
Even at first glance, major practical and policy reasons suggest that dangerousness is a poor basis for commitment. Psy104. 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975).
105. Id. at 514-15.
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chiatrists and sociologists are notoriously bad at predicting
dangerousness, and are prone to overpredict 0 6 The best methods, impossible under the conditions of commitment proceedings, yield 60 to 70% false positives (persons incorrectly
predicted as dangerous). 10 7 It has been suggested that, at the
very best, prediction will result in four errors for every correct
prediction (80% false positives),108 Similar limitations apply to
predictions of suicide. 10 9
Given that the general populace is not incarcerated because
of dangerousness, the mentally ill must be singled out either because they are seen as more dangerous as a class or as treatable. 110 If it is because they are viewed as both dangerous and
subject to treatment, an additional assumption is that their
dangerousness resultsfrom their mental illness. The mentally
ill, however, are not more dangerous as a class than the population as a whole, and are certainly less dangerous than various
other classes, such as ex-felons, or even youths."' In addition,
dangerousness has not been successfully treated. In fact, psychiatrists rarely claim to be able to treat dangerousness. 1 2 The
notion that dangerousness results from mental illness and will
disappear with treatment is largely unsubstantiated. Moreover,
curability need not be proven for commitment. 1 3 In addition,
many mental illnesses are presently untreatable. 1 4 If the
stated basis for confinement is that the dangerous mentally ill
106. See, e.g., Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist'sPower in Civil Commitment:
A Knife that Cuts Both Ways, 2 PSYCH. TODAY, 32, 33 (1969). See also Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictionsabout Predictions,23 J.
OF LEGAL ED. 24 (1970).
107. See, e.g., Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill

Criminals, 27 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIAT. 397, 397-98 (1972).
108. Id.
109. ENis &EMERY, supra note 1 at 49-50.

110. A third distinction sometimes suggested is that the mentally ill are

not deterrable. See notes 135-37 and accompanying text infra.

111. Giovanni & Jurel, Socially Disruptive Behavior of Ex Mental Patients, 17 ARcmHvs GEN. PSYCH. 146 (1967); Rappeport &Lassen, Dangerousness--Arrest Rate Comparisons of Discharged Patients and the General
Population,121 AM. J. PSYCH. 776 (1965); Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and CriminalActivity of the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-1970,
129 A. J. PSYCH. 304 (1972).

112. EmiNs &EMERY, supra note 1, at 46-47. Insorfar as behavioral conditioning may successfully treat dangerousness, there is no indication that it
is any more successful with the mentally ill than with the general
population.
113. Notably, courts have had great difficulty determining whether a past
act results from insanity, let alone predicting whether a future act would be

the product of present mental illness. See, e.g., People v. Sansone, 18 Ill.
App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974); EMN-s & EMERY, supra note 1, at 46;
MDLR, supra note 16, at 83-84.
114. Developments, supra note 3, 1232.
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are treatable, then commitment is based on a parens patriae
11 5
justification, and should be restricted accordingly.
From a psychiatric and general policy viewpoint, the dangerousness requirement is paradoxical. Its focus is the one element that the mental health system is least able to diagnose and
treat. The requirement also contributes to the "revolving door"
syndrome, since prediction of dangerousness becomes even
more difficult as length of hospitalization increases. 1 6 The identification and incarceration of the dangerous with the mentally
ill, aggravates the stigma of mental illness and interferes with
treatment of the mentally ill. Furthermore, psychiatric facilities
are not equipped or particularly competent to deal with the dangerous, and such commitments present a severe drain on resources which could be better used for treatment. Thus, if the
dangerousness requirement is maintained, at least a finding of
likely responsiveness to available treatment should be required.
For the nontreatable dangerous, including the suicidal, these
facts suggest that a recent overt dangerous act should be minimally required (to reduce prediction inaccuracy) and incarceration should be for short and finite time periods. Arguably, the
facts suggest a much broader conclusion: that the nontreatable
dangerous should be relegated to the criminal justice system,
and that they should not be incarcerated at all unless society is
willing to recognize and adopt a special system of preventive
detention.
The emphasis on dangerousness, rather than incompetence
and treatability, may tacitly result in preventive detention. In
Robinson v. California,n 7 for instance, a penal commitment was
distinguished as one which did not purport to provide for or require treatment." 8 Incarceration based not on a criminal violation, but on a prediction of a violation, is preventive detention.
Preventive detention is generally disfavored, and its use for the
mentally ill raises both due process and equal protection
problems. As presently applied, application of the dangerousness requirement results in incarceration without treatment
since many mental illnesses are presently untreatable.
Also, there is growing recognition of the right of the competent mentally ill to refuse treatment," 9 a right which has, in
115. See notes 142-55 and accompanying text infra.
116. INSIGHT COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 17, at 336.
117. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
118. See Logan v. Arafeh, 316 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (D. Conn. 1972).
119. Although barely mentioned in O'Connor v. Donaldson, Donaldson
rejected treatment on religious grounds. See ENNIS &EMERY, supra note 1,
at 132-33; Szasz, Involuntary Psychiatry,45 CINCINNATI L. REv. 350 (1975).

19821

Involuntary Commitment

some instances, been codified.' 2 0 Although the right to treatment is also receiving increased recognition, 121 and may be constitutionally mandated, the focus on dangerousness still permits
incarceration of those who are either competent to refuse treatment or untreatable. The right of a competent individual to re1 22
fuse treatment, unquestioned in the case of the physically ill
should, on equal protection grounds, be extended to the competent mentally ill. 123 Incarceration of the mentally ill, without
124
treatment, constitutes preventive detention. Since competent
individuals have a right to refuse treatment, incompetancy and
susceptibility to treatment should be required for all commitments to the mental health system.
Restraint and custody without treatment in mental hospitals is a waste of resources and poor public policy. Moreover, it
may be unconstitutional, either as punishment for status, 125 as
violative of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due pro126
cess clause, or as a violation of the equal protection clause.
Whether incarceration of the dangerous mentally ill without
treatment constitutes punishment for status has not been satisfactorily resolved by the courts. Two courts rejected the argument that dangerousness is a status, suggesting that rather, it is
expected future conduct. 127 This reasoning is unconvincing
128
since dangerousness, by itself, requires no conduct.
120. INSIGHT COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 17, at 324-30.

121. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F.
Supp. 1341, 344 F. Supp. 373 (1972), a fd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (The subsequent history relates to hearings to determine the proper standards for treatemnt); Casenote, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 9 AKRON L. REV. 374, 376 (1975).
122. See, e.g., Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1971).
123. Note, however, that at least one court has held that dangerousness

itself justifies involuntary treatment of competent mentally ill patients who
would otherwise be constitutionally entitled to refuse treatment. Davis v.
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980). This limitation of the right to
refuse treatment narrows, but does not eliminate, incarceration without
treatment. Also, as discussed above, it should not be assumed that dangerousness results from mental illness, and available treatments for dangeousness, if any, apply to the mentally ill and nonmentally ill alike.
124. It is well established that a finding of mental illness does not raise
even a presumption of incapacity. See, e.g., Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68
(2d Cir. 1971); Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1971); Logan v. Arafeh, 316
F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (D. Conn. 1972); INSIGHT COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 17,

at 324.
125. See notes 58-64 and accompanying text supra.
126. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1228.
127. U.S. ex rel. Matthew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ill. 1975); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974).
128. Overt Dangerousness,supra note 42, at 590 n.126.
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Preventive detention is usually considered an improper exercise of the police power, 129 partly because the inaccuracy of
prediction renders preventive detention arbitrary and capricious. 130 Involuntary commitments based on the present dangerousness requirement should be acknowledged as a form of
justified under the guise of
preventive detention and not falsely
13 1
providing for the mentally ill.
The equal protection clause requires that disparate treatment-in this case preventive detention of only the mentally
ill-be rationally based. Where disparate treatment affects fundamental interests or is based on a suspect classification, it
must serve a compelling state interest or survive "strict scrutiny."'1 32 Clearly, commitment affects fundamental interests.
Justifications offered for restricting preventive detention to the
mentally ill include that, as a class, they are more dangerous,
more treatable, or less deterrable by criminal sanctions. It has
already been indicated that the first justification is unacceptable. The mentally ill as a class are not more dangerous, and
incarceration of all mentally ill based on this stated purpose
would create under and overinclusive classes. 133 The second
justification, amenability to treatment, relies on the parens patriae power. Under the police power, requiring a competent individual to accept treatment is not a benefit but an additional
deprivation of liberty. 34 If the class were limited to the incompetent and treatable it would survive equal protection scrutiny.
The third justification recognizes that society relies on the
deterrent effect of the criminal justice system rather than upon
preventive detention. Thus, assuming that the mentally ill are
not deterrable, they are an arguably distinct class subject to preventive detention. It is questionable whether the state's interest
is sufficient to justify a deterrence system. 35 Assuming its suffi129. See Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (1969); Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d

964 (D.C. Cir. 1968); ENms & EMERY, supra note 1, at 45.

130. ENms & EMERY, supra note 1, at 46-47; Social Accountability: Preface to an Integrated Theory of Criminal and Mental Health Sanctions, Proceedings of the Biannual Conference on Psychology, Lincoln, Nebraska
(1974).
131. See Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1277 (1973);
Note, Mental Illness,A Suspect Classification?,83 YALE LJ. 1237, 1266 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Mental Illness ].
132. See Note, Mental Illness, supra note 131 at 1239.
133. The dangerous mentally ill are no more dangerous than the dangerous nonmentally ill, so the grounds for incarceration creates a grossly underinclusive class. Id.
134. Id. See Dershwitz, Preventive Confinement, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1277,
1319 (1973).
135. See Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1108
(1972). See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270
(1940); Developments, supra note 3, at 1233.
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ciency, however, the class is overinclusive since many of the
mentally ill can be deterred. The proper test would identify a
class with substantially diminished responsibility, analogous or
equivalent to the test of the insanity defense. 136 This test differs
markedly from the one presently employed and may be constitutionally required for police power commitments. Finally, it
has been convincingly argued that mental illness is a suspect
classification, that police power commitments for dangerousness and treatment are bound to be over or underinclusive, and
137
thus violate the equal protection clause.
It should be noted that the above equal protection arguments do not question either the parenspatriae or police powers to commit. Rather, they suggest that the police power
cannot be invoked exclusively because an individual is mentally
ill. The state may have power to preventively detain all dangerous individuals, or all dangerous and treatable individuals, or,
insofar as the equal protection clause is concerned, all incompetent individuals. Treatability and incompetence are classifications which, unlike mental illness, may survive strict scrutiny,
assuming the incompetent physically ill are also subject to compulsory treatment. Thus, although dangerousness may constitute sufficient grounds for incarcerating people, the requirement
is particularly unsuited to the concerns of the mentally ill.
Alternative or Additional Safeguards
Throughout this article, several safeguards other than dangerousness have been suggested, including incompetence, susceptibility to treatment, and the least restrictive alternative.
These safeguards merit further elaboration.
Incompetence
An individual is incompetent when he or she lacks the capacity to make treatment decisions. 3 8 The relevant considerations are whether the individual is able to understand the
nature, purpose, and benefits of treatment. If he has lost the
ability to make choices or is so confused that he cannot make a
decision having any relation to the relevant factors bearing on
his hospitalization, an individual is incompetent. This narrow
definition focuses solely upon the issue of whether the patient is
136. Developments, supra note 3, at 1234 n.181.
137. See generally, Mental Illness, supra note 131.
138. Incompetencey and incapacity have frequently been defined. See
INSIGHT COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 17, at 341, 343; Roth et al., Tests of
Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCH. 279-84 (1977); Developments, supra note 3, at 1217-19; MDLR, supra note 16, at 91-93.
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able to evaluate the risks, benefits, and alternatives to treatment. It looks at the decision-making process, and not at the
decision made, thus avoiding the circularity of adjudging an individual incompetent because he makes a decision other than
the judge would have made. That the state may be better informed suggests only that its information should be provided to
the patient. Considerations of liberty, privacy, and the recognition that myriad subtle factors may affect such a decision, demand that the state impose its judgment only where the
individual is clearly incapable of making reasonable
evaluations.
Based on common law principles as well as on the due process and equal protection clauses, proper parens patriae commitments require a finding of incapacity. 139 Incompetence is not
required for police power commitments, although substantially
diminished capacity may be. 140 At least some degree of incapacity, however, ought be required for public policy reasons. Those
dangerous to others or themselves, who cannot or will not be
treated, should not be relegated to the mental health system. If
their incarceration is justified under the police power, then care
and custody should be provided through guardianships, through
a separate system for short term preventive detention, or
through the criminal justice system. These proposals do not
deny treatment to the competent mentally ill. Rather, they recognize that, like the competent physically ill, the mentally ill
should be allowed a choice.
Moreover, incapacity need not always result in commitment. An additional safeguard is the balancing process the state
must go through in its role as parenspatriae. As substitute decision-maker, the state must objectively balance the factors related to promoting the ward's best interests. 14' Availability and
likelihood of success of treatment, alternatives to treatment,
likely length of confinement, social stigma, and general liberty
and privacy interests should be considered and balanced.
Clearly, a mentally ill individual might rationally choose to
forego institutionalization. Indeed, the requirement by courts
and legislatures that an individual must be dangerous to himself
can be viewed as the outcome of this balancing process. This
requirement recognizes that individuals who are not dangerous
to themselves are not likely to benefit enough from available
139. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1971); MDLR, supra note 16,
at 89-90.
140. See note 136 and accompanying text supra.
141. See Erris &EMERY, supra note 1, at 41, Developments, supra note 3,
at 1220-22.
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treatment to justify confinement. Recognition that the present
diagnosis and treatment of mental illness makes beneficial commitment unlikely provides a better basis for requiring dangerousness than does the questionable legal argument that parens
patriae has been discredited. This approach is preferable because it focuses on evaluation of the mental health system and
the needs of the mentally ill. It does not foreclose the possibility
that as the mental health system improves, dangerousness to
self might no longer be required to strike a beneficial balance in
favor of commitment.
It has been suggested that incompetence should also be required for commitment of those dangerous to others. A balancing process similar to that outlined above should be used. The
extent of an individual's dangerousness to others would then be
considered only in the context of the police power decision
whether incarceration outside of the mental health system is appropriate. In determining whether to commit an incompetent
individual to the mental health system, dangerousness would be
considered only insofar as it impacts the best interests of the
individual.
Susceptibility to Available Treatment
Several courts have held that involuntarily committed patients have a constitutional right to treatment. 142 Although
O'Connorcasts doubt upon the extent of this right,143 it appears
to be well established that when the state's main justification for
incarceration is the need for treatment, such treatment is required. 144 Presently, police power commitments do not require
treatment. Parenspatriae commitments, at least insofar as they
are based on the need for treatment rather than on preventing
harm to self, clearly do.1 45 The criteria for commitment proposed above suggests that only those who are likely to benefit
from available treatment should be committed to the mental
health system. The competent mentally ill who will not or cannot be treated, but for whom society wishes to provide custody,
would be handled outside the mental health system.
142. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp.
1341, 344 F. Supp. 373 (1972), affd sub nom, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974). See Casenote, O'CONNOR V. DONALDSON, 9 AKRON L. REV.

(1975) and cases cited therein; Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D.
Ala. 1974).
143. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
144. Id. See note 141 supra.
145. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,578 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concur-

ring); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.
Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Developments, supra note 3, at 1222.
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Technically, susceptibility to available treatment is not an
independent safeguard, but rather a major and often determinative factor in the state's balancing process when acting for an
incompetent. Many courts, rejecting the state's power to act as
parens patriae, have relied on the fact that treatment is often
unavailable or grossly inadequate. 146 Rather than resulting in
the rejection of parenspatriae as a ground for commitment, this
observation reveals why susceptibility to available treatment is
a major requirement ofparenspatriaecommitments. If the concern is that those committed are not getting proper treatment, a
"treatability" requirement is a better, more appropriate safeguard than is the dangerousness requirement. Unlike the dangerousness standard, a treatability requirement would conserve
available resources for those actually capable of benefiting from
them.
Four factors concerning treatment may be identified:
(1) likelihood of improvement of the patient; (2) degree of improvement; (3) dangers of treatment; and (4) dangers of failing
to treat. 147 All of these factors must be weighed in determining
whether an individual is "treatable." Since guaranteeing and
predicting the success of treatment are very difficult, commitment should be short-term, allowing for periodic review of the
treatment. 148 This may be constitutionally required by the reasonable relation test in Jackson.149 If sufficient treatment guarantees are not presently possible, then no one should be
involuntarily committed to the mental health system.
Least Restrictive Alternative

This constitutional doctrine has recently been applied to all
types of commitment procedures. 150 Implicit in the least restric146. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Lessard v.

Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on proceduralgrounds,
414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated on procedural grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
147. E.Z. DuBose, Jr., Of the Parens Patriae Commitment Power and
Drug Treatment of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the Patient Justify In-

voluntary Treatment?, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1157 (1976); MDLR, supra note
16, at 93-94.
148. INSIGHT COMmuNCATINS, supra note 16, at 235; MDLR, supra note 16,
at 85.
149. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); MDLR, supra note 16, at 85.
150. Scott v. Plante, No. 80-1314 (3rd Cir., Feb. 5, 1981); Rogers v. Okin, 634
F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980) (less restrictive course of action required); Dixon v.
Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095-96 (E.D.

Wis. 1972), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated,

379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated on proceduralgrounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975),
reinstated 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976); EmIs &EMERY, supra note 1, at 57-59;
Casenote, Mental Health-United States ex rel. Matthew v. Nelson Civil

Involuntary Commitment

19821

tive alternative doctrine is the argument that alternatives to institutionalization should be further developed. This doctrine is
responsive to problems of diagnosis, treatment, and particularly
loss of liberty, in a manner that is sensitive to both the concerns
of the mental health system and those of the mentally ill.
CONCLUSION
The model suggested by the above discussion and analysis
can be diagrammed as follows:
RESULT

CATEGORY
A. Dangerous to others:
- incompetent and treatable**

-

not treatable*

Commitment to Least Restrictive Alternative

(CLRA)
New short term Preventive
Detention system or
Criminal Justice system

(PD)
-

B.

treatable and competent*

Dangerous to self:
1. Suicidal
- incompetent and treatable**
- not treatable
- treatable and competent
2. Care and Custody
- incompetent and not treatable***
- incompetent and treatable**
- competent and treatable
- competent and not treatable***

C.

***

CLRA
PD
Choice of PD or CLRA
PD
CLRA
Choice of CLRA or no intervention

Choice of PD or no intervention

Not Dangerous:
- not treatable
- competent

*
**

Choice of PD or CLRA

No intervention
Choice of no intervention or

CLRA

CLRA
- incompetent and treatable**
May also require substantially diminished responsibility.
Findings of incompetence and susceptibility to treatment are meant to
include a finding that the balance of interests justifies commitment.
This is most likely to be true in cases where the individual is dangerous to himself, and least likely true where he is not dangerous.
For those unable to care for themselves, PD would be some form of
guardianship (the least restrictive alternative).

Commitment of the Mentally Ill Based on a Finding of Dangerousness is
Constitutional,Even Though DangerousnessIs Not Inferred From a Recen4
Overt DangerousAct, 7 Loy. Cm. L.J. 507, 519 (1976).
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Once it is recognized that the mental health system is presently being used for preventive detention, this model does not
differ radically from the commitment statutes. Nevertheless,
the model illuminates the ramifications of a dangerousness requirement. There is no longer any doubt that in the past we
have viewed the best interests of the mentally ill individual too
narrowly. Commitment affects fundamental interests and must
be subject to due process. Recognition of the nontreatment effects of involuntary commitment necessitates a search for safeguards. There is, however, grave doubt about both the
sufficiency and necessity of a dangerousness safeguard. Due to
narrow legal analysis and misunderstanding of parens patriae,
the dangerous requirement has been ill applied.
Approaching the problem solely from the standpoint of societal interests, dangerousness to others may be a proper ground
for incarceration of anyone, or of those with diminished responsibility, but not just of the mentally ill. The dangerousness requirement developed from concerns that the mentally ill not be
unnecessarily depreived of liberty, but has little to do with the
concerns of the mentally ill in particular. From the standpoint
of the mentally ill, deprivation of liberty through commitment
would be curtailed at least as much (both in numbers and
length of time) and applied to a more appropriate class if incompetency, susceptability to treatment, and a best interests evaluation were required. These requirements are also more
responsive to the problems of diagnosis and treatment. Indeed,
given the present state of diagnosis and treatment, it may be
that using the above criteria, individuals could not, presently be
committed in their own best interests. Thus, these alternative
safeguards would also create pressures to improve the mental
health system.
These alternative safeguards are required for parens patriae commitments based on the need for treatment. If the present mental health system cannot provide sufficient treatment
guarantees, then dangerousness to self must be required in order that commitment be in the individual's best interests. This
is a difficult balance to strike, but it allows for the possibility
that, at least at some future date, commitment of nondangerous
mentally ill individuals who are incompetent may be beneficial.
Case by case due process interest balancing does not warrant
the categorical judgment that treatment benefits never outweigh
liberty interests. 151
151. Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a ConstitutionalRequirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. CmI. L.
REv. 562, 582 (1977).
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Since susceptibility to treatment and improvement are difficult to evaluate, commitment on this ground would necessarily
be brief unless the state could meet the formidable burden of
proving that the patient was improving. If beneficial treatment
is available, there are very strong arguments for providing it to
those who cannot make an independent decision. "Not committing a non-dangerous mentally ill individual who is incapable of
making rational decisions and could benefit from treatment is
analogous to not hospitalizing an unconscious accident victim
who is unable to ask for help but is not dangerous. ' 15 2 Also,
"[t] here is a large group of prospective patients who are not yet
dangerous to themselves or others, who are not mentally able to
realize their condition or make responsible decisions, but who
their condition deteriorates, as it
need hospitalization before
15 3
may without treatment.
The "move toward dangerousness" has to some extent entailed an abdication of responsibility for the care and treatment
of those who are incompetent. Present commitment standards
and the present use of the balancing doctrine, assume that liberty and personal welfare interests are severable and, at times,
antagonistic. They ignore the fact that beneficial treatment,
though involuntarily received, may ultimately increase personal
welfare, options, freedom, and autonomy. Just as we compel our
children (by definition, incompetent) to learn to read, we should
impose available beneficial treatment on the clearly mentally incompetent. Requiring strong proof of incompetence and susceptibility to, availability of, and later, success of treatment, better
safeguards against the abuse of involuntary commitment than
does the requirement of dangerousness.

152. Peszke, Dangerousness and Issues for Physicians in Emergency
Commitment, 132 Am. J.

PSYCH.

825, 827 (1975), quoted in E.Z. DuBose, Jr.,

Of the ParensPatriaeCommitment Power and Drug Treatment of Schizohprenia " Do the Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60
Im-N.L. REV. 1149, 1158 (1976).

153. Ross, supra note 12, at 959.

